We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D. We show that if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. This includes buyers who are k-demand, additive up to a matroid constraint, or additive up to constraints of any downwards-closed set system (and whose values for the individual items are sampled independently), as well as buyers who are fractionally subadditive with item multipliers drawn independently. Our proof makes use of the core-tail decomposition framework developed in prior work showing similar results for the significantly simpler class of additive buyers [Li and Yao 2013; Babaioff et al. 2014] .
INTRODUCTION
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose value for sets of items is unknown, but drawn from a known distribution D. When n = 1, seminal work of Myerson [Myerson 1981 ] and Riley and Zeckhauser [Riley and Zeckhauser 1983] shows that the optimal selling scheme simply sets the price p * = arg max{p · Pr[v ≥ p|v ← D]}. Thirty years later, understanding the structure of the optimal mechanism when n > 1 still remains a central open problem. Unfortunately, it is well-known that the optimal mechanism may require randomization, behave non-monotonically, and be computationally hard to find, even in very simple instances [Thanassoulis 2004; Pavlov 2011; Briest et al. 2010; Daskalakis et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2014; Hart and Nisan 2013; Hart and Reny 2012] . In light of this, recent work began studying the performance of especially simple auctions through the lens of approximation. Remarkably, these works have shown that when the bidder's valuation is additive 1 , and her value for each item is drawn independently, very simple mechanisms can achieve quite good approximation ratios. Specifically, techniques developed in this series of works proves that the better of setting Myerson's reserve on each item separately or setting Myerson's reserve on the grand bundle of all items together achieves a 6-approximation [Hart and Nisan 2012; Li and Yao 2013; Babaioff et al. 2014] .
While this model of buyer values is certainly mathematically interesting and economically motivated, it is also perhaps too simplistic to have broad real-world applications. A central question left open by these works is whether or not simple mechanisms can still approximate optimal ones in more general settings. In this work we resolve this question in the affirmative, showing that the better of selling separately (we will henceforth use SREV to denote the revenue of the optimal such mechanism) or together (henceforth BREV) still obtains a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue (henceforth REV) when buyer values are combinatorial in nature but complement-free.
INFORMAL THEOREM 1. Let D be any distribution over subadditive valuation functions with independent items. Then max{SREV, BREV} ≥ Ω(1) · REV. Furthermore, prices providing this guarantee can be found computationally efficiently.
We postpone a formal definition of exactly what it means for D to have "independent items" to Section 2. We note here a few instantiations of our model in commonly studied settings (from least to most general):
-k-demand: The buyer has value v i for item i, and the v i s are drawn independently.
The buyer's value for a set S is v(S) = max T ⊆S,|T |≤k { i∈T v i }. -Additive up to constraints I: I is some downwards-closed set system on [n] . The buyer has value v i for item i, and the v i s are drawn independently. v(S) = max T ⊆S,T ∈I { i∈T v i }. -Fractionally-subadditive: buyer has "possible values" {v ij } j for item i, and the sets {v ij } j are drawn independently across items (but may be correlated within an item). v(S) = max j { i∈S v ij }.
A recent book of Hartline [Hartline 2011 ] provides a fantastic discussion of the role of approximation in mechanism design. Before proceeding, it is worth repeating some aspects of this discussion to view our result in the proper context. One should not interpret our main result as claiming that sellers should be satisfied with a constant fraction of the optimal obtainable revenue, but rather as studying the tradeoff between simplicity and optimality. Sometimes, the optimal mechanism simply isn't an option: perhaps it is prohibitively complex to implement, prohibitively frustrating for buyers to participate, or prohibitively difficult (computationally) to find. And even when the optimal mechanism is a feasible option, the desire for simplicity and transparency may outweigh the expected loss in revenue. Similarly, one should not interpret the ratios obtained in our main result (they are noticeably larger than 6) as ratios that one might expect to trade off in practice, as these are provable bounds for worst-case instances.
Challenges of Combinatorial Valuations
The design of simple, approximately optimal mechanisms for any non-trivial multiitem setting has been a large focus for much of the Algorithmic Game Theory com-munity over the past decade. Even "simple" settings with additive or unit-demand valuations required significant breakthroughs. The key insight enabling these breakthroughs for additive buyers is that the buyer's valuation is separable across items. While the optimal mechanism can still be quite bizarre despite this realization [Hart and Reny 2012] , this fact enables certain elementary decomposition theorems that are surprisingly powerful (e.g. the "Marginal Mechanism" [Cai and Huang 2013; Hart and Nisan 2012] ). However, these theorems are extremely sensitive to being able to separate the marginal contribution of different items exactly (and not just via upper/lower bounds). This is due to the phenomenon that a slight miscalculation in estimating a buyer's value may cause her to change preferences entirely, resulting in a potentially unbounded loss of revenue. One of our main technical contributions is overcoming this obstacle by providing an approximate version of these decomposition theorems.
A further complication in applying these previous techniques is that they all make use of the fact that SREV(
This claim is not even approximately true for subadditive buyers, and the ratio between the two values could be as large as n (the right-hand side is always larger). To have any hope of applying these tools, we therefore need a proxy for SREV that at least approximately has this separability property.
For unit-demand buyers, the key insight behind the mechanisms designed in [Chawla et al. 2007 [Chawla et al. , 2010a Kleinberg and Weinberg 2012] is that every multidimensional problem instance has a related single-dimensional problem instance, and there is a correspondence between truthful mechanisms in the two instances. This realization means that one can instead design mechanisms for the single-dimensional setting, where optimal mechanisms are well understood due to Myerson's virtual values, and translate them in a black-box manner to mechanisms for the original instance. While these techniques have proven extremely fruitful in the design of mechanisms for multiple unit-demand buyers and sophisticated feasibility constraints, they have also proven to be limited in use to unit-demand settings. A special case of our results can be seen as providing an alternative proof of the single-buyer result of Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg [Chawla et al. 2007 ] (albeit with a significantly worse constant) that doesn't require virtual valuation machinery.
Aside from the difficulties in applying existing machinery to design optimal mechanisms for combinatorial valuations, formal barriers exist as well. For instance, it is a trivial procedure for an additive buyer to select his utility-maximizing set of items when facing an item-pricing, and finding the revenue-optimal item-pricing is also trivial (just find the optimal price for each item separately). Yet for a subadditive buyer, both tasks are quite non-trivial. Just computing the expected revenue obtained by a fixed item-pricing is NP-hard. Worse, the buyer's problem of just selecting her utilitymaximizing set from a given item-pricing is also NP-hard! Therefore, buyers may behave quite unpredictably in the face of an item-pricing depending on how well they can optimize. Moreover, even if we are willing to assume that the buyer has the computational power to select her utility-maximizing set, it is known still that (without our independence assumption) finding an n c -approximately optimal mechanism is NP-hard for all c = O(1) . We sidestep all these difficulties by not attempting to compute or approximate SREV at all, nor trying to predict bizarre buyer behavior. We instead perform our analysis on revenue contributions only of items purchased when the buyer is not willing to purchase any others. Buyer behavior in such instances is predictable and easily computable: simply purchase the unique item for which v({i}) > p i . It is surprising that such an analysis suffices, as it completely ignores any revenue contribution coming from the entirely plausible event that the buyer is willing to purchase multiple items.
Techniques
We prove our main theorem by making use of the core-tail decomposition framework introduced by Li and Yao [Li and Yao 2013] . There are three high-level steps to applying the framework. The first is proving a "core decomposition" lemma that separates the optimal revenue into contributions from items which the buyer values very highly (the "tail"), and items which the buyer values not so high (the "core"). The second is showing that the contribution from the tail can be approximated well by SREV. The third is showing that the contribution from the core can be approximated well by max{SREV, BREV}.
The Core Decomposition Lemma. The proof of the original Core Decomposition Lemma in [Li and Yao 2013] was obtained by cleverly stringing together simple claims proved in [Hart and Nisan 2012] . As discussed above, these seemingly "obvious" claims may not extend beyond additive valuations over independent items, due to the fact that the buyer's value cannot be separated across items. Nevertheless, we are able to prove an approximate version of the core decomposition lemma for subadditive buyers (Lemma 3.6) by making use of ideas from reductions from -truthful mechanisms to fully truthful ones. Like in [Babaioff et al. 2014] , our core decomposition lemma holds for many buyers. The proof for a single buyer, which is the focus of this paper can be found in Section 3.1. In the full version we also provide a more technically involved proof for many buyers which builds on heavier tools from [Bei and Huang 2011; Hartline et al. 2011; Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012] .
Bounding the Tail's Contribution. Arguments for bounding the contribution from the tail in prior work (and ours) use the following reasoning. If the cutoff between core and tail is sufficiently high, then the probability that k items are simultaneously in the tail for a sampled valuation decays exponentially in k. If one can also show that the approximation guarantee of SREV decays subexponentially in k, then we can bound the gap between SREV and the tail's contribution by a constant factor. We show that indeed the approximation guarantee of SREV decays only polynomially in k.
Bounding the Core's Contribution. Arguments for bounding the contribution from the core in prior work (and ours) use the following reasoning. The total expected value for items in the core is a subadditive function of independent random variables (bounded above by the core-tail cutoff). If the cutoff between core and tail is sufficiently low, then one of two things must happen. Either the expected contribution from the core is also small, in which case SREV itself provides a good approximation, or the expected contribution is large, and therefore also large with respect to the cutoffs. In the latter case, a concentration bound implies that BREV must provide a good approximation. In the additive case, the appropriate concentration bound is Chebyshev's inequality. In the subadditive case, we need heavier tools, and apply a concentration bound due to Schechtman [Schechtman 1999 ].
Connection to Approximate Revenue-Monotonicity
Consider designing revenue-optimal mechanisms for two different markets, and suppose that the valuations of the consumers in the first market first-order stochastically dominate 2 the valuations of the consumers in the second market. It then seems reasonable to expect that the optimal revenue achieved from the first market, REV(D + ), should be at least as large as the revenue achieved from the dominated market, REV(D). When there is just a single item for sale, this is an easy corollary of the format for Myerson's optimal auction. Yet Hart and Reny provided an example where this intuition breaks even in a setting as simple as an additive buyer with i.i.d. values for two items [Hart and Reny 2012] . Surprisingly, their example shows that it is possible to make strictly more revenue in a market when buyers have strictly less value for your goods, and the market need not even be very complex for this phenomenon to occur.
A natural question to ask then, is how large this anomaly can be. (D)). Specifically, for an additive buyer the gap is at most (1 + 1/e) for two i.i.d. items, 2 for two asymmetric independent items, and 6 for any number of independent items. In Section 4 we show that as a corollary of our results, the gap is also constant for a subadditive buyer with independent items. Interestingly, this connection between approximately optimal simple mechanisms and approximate revenue-monotonicity is also fruitful in the other direction: it turns out that improving the bound on approximate monotonicity for a subadditive buyer would also improve the constant in our main theorem. Finally, we show in Section 4.3 that for an additive buyer with correlated values for two items, the gap is potentially infinite. (This is the case for which Hart and Reny provide a gap of 33/32.) The proof is by a black-box reduction from an example due to Hart and Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2013] that exhibits a similar gap between simple and optimal mechanisms, further demonstrating the connection between these two important research directions.
Discussion and Open Problems
Our work contributes to the recent growing literature on simple, approximately optimal mechanisms. We extend greatly beyond prior work, providing the first simple and approximately optimal mechanisms for buyers with combinatorial valuations. Prior to our work, virtually nothing was known about this setting (modulo the impossibility result of . Our results also demonstrate the strength of the core-tail decomposition framework developed by Li and Yao to go beyond additive buyers. We suspect that this framework will continue to prove useful in other Bayesian mechanism design problems.
In our opinion, the most exciting open question in this area is extending these results to multiple buyers. A beautiful lookahead reduction was recently developed by Yao [Yao 2015 ] for additive buyers. Still, generalizing his tools beyond additive buyers seems quite challenging and is a very intriguing direction. Another important direction is extending our understanding of simple mechanisms to models of limited correlation over values for disjoint sets of items 3 . Recent independent work of Bateni et. al. [Bateni et al. 2015] addresses this direction, providing approximation guarantees on max{SREV, BREV} vs. REV for an additive buyer whose values for items are drawn from a common-base-value distribution and various extensions. Their results also make use of a core-tail decomposition, but the tools they develop beyond the decomposition are disjoint from ours. A natural question in this direction is whether our results extend to settings where buyer values are both combinatorial and exhibit lim-ited correlation between disjoint sets of items, as the end goal is to have a model that encompasses as many real-world instances as possible.
PRELIMINARIES
We focus the body of the exposition on the single-buyer problem, and defer all details regarding auctions for multiple buyers to the full version. There is a single revenuemaximizing seller with n items for sale to a single buyer. The buyer has combinatorial valuations for the items (i.e. value v(S) for receiving set S), and is quasi-linear and risk-neutral. That is, the buyer's utility for a randomized outcome that awards him set S with probability A (S) while paying (expected) price p is S A (S) v(S) − p. The valuation v(·) is unknown to the seller, who has a prior D over possible buyer valuations that is subadditive over independent items, a term we describe below. By the taxation principle, the seller may restrict attention to only lottery systems. In other words, the seller provides a list of potential lotteries (distributions over sets) each with a price, and the buyer chooses the utility-maximizing option.
Subadditive valuations over independent items
We now carefully define what we mean by subadditive valuations over independent items. Intuitively, our model is such that the buyer has some private information x i pertaining to item i, 4 and D x is a product distribution over R n representing the seller's prior over the private information possessed by the buyer. The buyer's valuation for set S is parametrized by the private information she has about items in that set, and can be written as V ( x i i∈S , S). In economic terms, this models that the items not received by the buyer impose no externalities. We capture this formally in the definition below:
n → R is subadditive over independent items if: (1) All v(·) in the support of D exhibit no externalities.
Formally, let Ω S = × i∈S Ω i , where each Ω i is a compact subset of a normed space.
There exists a distribution D x over Ω [n] and functions V S : Ω S → R such that D is the distribution that first samples x ← D x and outputs the valuation function v(·)
(4) The private information is independent across items. That is, the D x guaranteed in property 1 is a product distribution.
We describe now how to encode commonly studied valuation distributions in this model.
Example 2.2. The following types of distributions can be modeled as subadditive over independent items. (Recall that x is the vector of independently sampled attributes in the definition above.)
(1) Additive: Let Ω i = [0, 1] and interpret x i as the buyer's value for item i.
and interpret x i as the buyer's value for item i.
V S ( x i i∈S ) = max T ⊆S,|T |≤k { i∈T x i }. V S ( x i i∈S ) = max T ⊆S,T ∈I { i∈T x i }.
(4) Fractionally subadditive: Let Ω i = [0, 1] k for any finite k and interpret x i as encoding the values {v ij } j∈ [k] . V S ( x i i∈S ) = max j { i∈S v ij }.
Notation
Definition 2.3. For any distribution D of buyer's valuation, we use the following notation, most of which is due to [Hart and Nisan 2012; Babaioff et al. 2014] :
-t: the cutoff between core and tail. If v({i}) > t, we say that item i is in the tail.
Otherwise it is in the core. The maximum revenue obtainable from a buyer with valuation profile drawn from D by pricing each item separately. Note that when the buyer is not additive, SREV(D) behaves erratically and is NP-hard to find [Chen et al. 2014 ]. -REV q (D): For a one-dimensional distribution D, the optimal revenue obtained by a reserve price that sells with probability at most q. When the distribution is clear from the context, we simply use REV, VAL, etc. Most of this notation is standard following [Hart and Nisan 2012] , with the exception of REV q and SREV * q . We introduce SREV * q because it will serve as a proxy to SREV that behaves nicely and is easy to compute. Note that SREV * q is essentially computing the revenue of the best item pricing that sells item i with probability at most q i , but only counting revenue from cases where the other values are too low to have possibly sold (and actually it undercounts this quantity).
Remark 2.4. In our definitions of REV q (D) and SREV * q (D) we assume without loss of generality that for every single-dimensional D and q ∈ [0, 1] it is possible to set a price that sells with probability exactly q. When D is a continuous distribution, this is true by the intermediate value theorem. When D has a point mass, this is no longer true per se. Fortunately, there are standard methods for reducing the study of arbitrary distributions to continuous ones with arbitrarily small loss. We briefly sketch one, a rounding scheme commonly attributed to Nisan (that appears also in [Chawla et al. 2007; Cai and Huang 2013] 
For any > 0, D can be "smoothed" into a continuous distribution D by multiplying samples from D by a random factor drawn uniformly from [1, 1 + ]. For any smoothed D , the desired prices exist by the intermediate value theorem. Using techniques similar in spirit to those of Section 3.1, it is easy (both computationally and conceptually) to convert mechanisms for D to mechanisms for D, and vice versa, with negligible (dependent on ) loss in revenue. Therefore, one may formally study D for sufficiently small , and all results hold with respect to D as well with negligible loss (and taking → 0 results in no loss at all). So for the remainder of the paper, we will assume w.l.o.g. that all distributions are continuous, and therefore the desired prices exist.
We conclude the preliminaries by stating a lemma of Hart and Nisan that we will use. We include the proof below for completeness, as well as to verify that it continues to hold when the valuations are not additive. 
MAIN RESULT: CONSTANT-FACTOR APPROXIMATION FOR SUBADDITIVE BUYER
THEOREM 3.1. When D is subadditive over independent items, there exists a probability vector q such that:
Furthermore, q can be computed efficiently, as well as an induced item pricing that yields expected revenue at least SREV * q (D). Proof outline. We follow the core-tail decomposition framework. First, we provide an approximate core decomposition lemma in Section 3.1. Then, we provide a bound on the contribution of the core with respect to max BREV, SREV * in Section 3.2, and a bound on the contribution of the tail with respect to SREV * as a function of the cutoffs chosen in Section 3.3.
For ease of exposition, we simply set t so that the probability of having an empty tail is exactly half; i.e. p ∅ = (1 − p i ) = 1/2. We also set q = p.
Approximate Core Decomposition
In this section, we prove our approximate core decomposition lemma. The key ingredient will be an approximate version of the "Marginal Mechanism" lemma from [Cai and Huang 2013; Hart and Nisan 2012] for subadditive buyers, stated below: LEMMA 3.2. ("Approximate Marginal Mechanism") Let S, X be a partition of [n] , and let D = D S , D X be the joint distribution for the valuations of items in S, X, respectively, for buyers with subadditive valuations. Then for any 0 < < 1,
When D S and D X are independent, this simplifies to
We outline the proof of Lemma 3.2 below. We first recall the original "Marginal Mechanism" lemma (that holds for an additive buyer without any multipliers). We provide a complete proof so that the reader can see where the argument fails for subadditive buyers. Let also D S denote D + restricted to items in S and
PROOF. We design a mechanism M X (the "Marginal Mechanism") to sell items in X to consumers sampled from D X |v S based on the optimal mechanism M for selling items in S X to consumers sampled from D + . Define A(v) to be the (possibly random) allocation of items awarded to type v in M , and p(v) to be the price paid. Let M X first sample a value v S ← D S . The buyer is then invited to report any type v X , and M X will award him the items in A(v S , v X )∩X and charge him price p(v
. In other words, the buyer will receive value from exactly the same items in M X as he would have received in M , except he receives the actual items in X, whereas for items in S he is given a monetary rebate instead of his actual value.
We first claim that if M is truthful, then so is M X . The utility of a buyer with type v X for reporting w X to M X can be written as: 
Taking an expectation over all v S (and an application of sub-domain stitching) yields the lemma.
Notice that it is crucial in the proof above that the buyer's value could be written as
Otherwise the auctioneer does not know how much to "reimburse" the buyer, since the correct amount depends on the buyer's private information. The buyer can then manipulate his own report v X to influence how much he gets reimbursed for the items in S.
A natural approach then, given any distribution D over subadditive valuations, is to define a new value distribution D + by redefining all v(·) to satisfy v(U ) = v(U ∩ S) + v(U ∩ X) (it is easy to see that all valuations in the support of D + are still subadditive). Unfortunately, even though D + (first-order stochastically) dominates D, due to nonmonotonicity we could very well have REV(D + ) < REV(D). Still, we bound the revenue lost as we move from D to D + by making use of tools for turning -truthful mechanisms into truly truthful ones. Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 below capture this formally. 
PROOF. Consider a mechanism M which achieves the optimal revenue REV(D). Let (φ v , p v ) denote the lottery purchased by a buyer with type v in M , where φ v is a (possibly randomized) allocation, and p is a price. Consider now the mechanism M + that offers the same menu as M , but with all prices discounted by a factor of (1 − ). Let 
Now, summing equations (2) and (3) (then making use of the definition of δ(·) and the fact that it is non-negative), we have:
We can now bound the expected revenue by taking an expectation over all valuations:
For a given partition of [n], S X, and distribution D over subadditive valuations, define D S to be D restricted to items in S, and D + to first sample v ← D, and output
this means that D and D
+ are coupled so that we can set δ(U ) ≤ v(S) for all U . Therefore, we may setδ = VAL(D S ) in the hypothesis of Lemma 3.4. The corollary follows by rearranging the inequality.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is now a combination of Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 3.3. We can now provide our approximate core decomposition by combining sub domain stitching (Lemma 2.5) and approximate marginal mechanism (Lemma 3.2). LEMMA 3.6. ("Approximate Core Decomposition") For any distribution D that is subadditive over independent items, and any 0 < < 1,
In particular, for = 1/2, we have
Finally, by sub-domain stitching (Lemma 2.5):
Core
Here, we show how to bound VAL(D C ∅ ) using max{SREV * q (D), BREV(D)}. We use a concentration result due to Schechtman [Schechtman 1999 ] that first requires a definition.
Definition 3.7. Let D x denote a distribution of private information, V denote a valuation function V ( x, ·), and D denote the distribution that samples x ← D
x and outputs the function v(·) = V ( x, ·). Then D is c−Lipschitz if for all x, y, and sets S and T we have:
Before applying Schechtman's theorem, we show that D C ∅ is t-Lipschitz (recall that t is the cutoff between core and tail).
LEMMA 3.8. Let D be any distribution that is subadditive over independent items where each v({i}) ∈ [0, c] with probability 1. Then D is c-Lipschitz.
PROOF. For any x, y, S, T , let U = {i ∈ S ∩ T |x i = y i }. Because of no externalities, we must have V ( x, U ) = V ( y, U ), which we will denote by B. By monotonicity, we must have V ( x, S), V ( y, T ) ≥ B. By subadditivity and the fact that each V ( x, {i}) ≤ c, we have V ( x, S) ≤ c(|S| − |U |) + B. Similarly, we have V ( y, T ) ≤ c(|T | − |U |) + B. It's also clear that |S| − |U | ≤ |S ∪ T | − |S ∩ T | + |{i ∈ S ∩ T : x i = y i }|, and that |T |−|U | ≤ |S ∪T |−|S ∩T |+|{i ∈ S ∩T : x i = y i }|. So we also must have
Now we state Schechtman's theorem and apply it to bound VAL(D C ∅ ). THEOREM 3.10. ( [Schechtman 1999] ) Suppose that D is a distribution that is subadditive over independent items and c-Lipschitz. Then for any parameters q, a, k > 0,
In particular, if a is the median of v ([n]) | v←D and q = 2, we have
Suppose that D is a distribution that is subadditive over independent items and c-Lipschitz. If a is the median of
We can upper bound this using the minimum of 1 and the bound provided in Theorem 3.10 to yield:
Since a is the median of v ([n]), we can set price a on the grand bundle and extract revenue at least a/2. Therefore, BREV ≥ a/2. The proposition then follows by combining Corollaries 3.9 and 3.11.
Finally, if the cutoff t is not too large, we can recover a constant fraction of it by selling each item separately.
Finally, we observe that i p i is exactly the expected number of items in the tail, and p ∅ is the probability that zero items are in the tail. So we clearly have
Combining Proposition 3.12 and Lemma 3.13 then yields: PROPOSITION 3.14.
VAL(D
C ∅ ) ≤ 6BREV + 24SREV * p .
Tail
We now show that the revenue from the tail can be approximated by SREV * q . We begin by proving a much weaker bound on the optimum revenue for any distribution of subadditive valuations over independent items: LEMMA 3.15.
PROOF. Babaioff et al. [Babaioff et al. 2014 ] prove that REV ≤ n i REV (D i ) for an additive buyer by recursively reducing the number of items by one at each step. Unfortunately, each step of the induction uses the Marginal Mechanism Lemma; when applying the approximate variant for subadditive valuations, we would incur an exponential factor.
Instead, we use a slightly more complicated argument along the lines of Hart and Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2012] that halves the number of items in each step. Let S and X be a partition of [n] into subsets of size at most n/2 . Let D S≥X be the distribution over valuations which is the same as D whenever v (S) ≥ v (T ), and has valuation zero otherwise. Similarly, let D S<X be the distribution which is equal to D on v (S) < (T ). Then by sub-domain stitching (Lemma 2.5) we have,
Now, by the Approximate Marginal Mechanism Lemma,
One mechanism for selling items in S is to sample v X ← D X S≥X , and then use a mechanism that achieves REV D S S≥X | v X . Thus we have,
Another way to sell items in S is to again sample v X ← D X S≥X , and offer the entire bundle for price v X (X). Therefore we also have,
Combining equations (5)- (7), we have
By symmetry, the same holds for REV (D S<X ) and REV D X . Therefore using (4),
Applying the recursion log n times, we have
Note that in Lemma 3.15, i REV(D i ) is not the same as SREV(D) as the buyer is not necessarily additive. In fact, they can be off by a factor of n (in the case of a unit-demand buyer). Nonetheless, this weak bound suffices for our analysis of the tail, which is summarized in Proposition 3.16 below. Essentially, the proposition amplifies the bound in Lemma 3.15 greatly by making use of the fact that it is unlikely to see multiple items in the tail. 
In particular, if we choose t so that
PROOF. Our proof builds on the intuition that the number of items in the tail is typically very small. By Lemma 3.15, we have that
For any i, the expression A i |A| p A /p i is also the expected number of items in the tail, conditioning on i being in the tail. Similarly, A i |A| log 2 6 p A /p i is the expected value of (# items) log 2 6 . Let b j be the indicator random variable that is 1 whenever item j is in the tail. Noting that log 2 6 < 3 and each b j is 1 with probability exactly p j and the b j 's are independent, we have:
(9) follows because b j ∈ {0, 1}. We continue to bound the last line as a function of just p ∅ . Note that e − i pi ≥ i (1 − p i ) = p ∅ , and therefore we have i p i ≤ ln(1/p ∅ ). Combining with (8) and (10), we have:
Finally, notice that the only bundle price we ever need to set to obtain our guarantee is the median of v([n]), when v(·) ← D C ∅ . It is also easy to see that our bounds degrade smoothly if we set a price that only approximates the median instead. For a discussion of exactly what access to D suffices in order for these prices/cutoffs to be truly easy to find, we refer the reader to [Babaioff et al. 2014] . We note here just that it should be clear that any reasonable, even minimal, access to D does indeed suffice.
SIMPLE AUCTIONS AND APPROXIMATE REVENUE MONOTONICITY
In this section we explore the rich connection between approximately optimal simple auctions, and approximate revenue monotonicity. By approximate revenue monotonicity, we formally mean the following:
Definition 4.1. We say that a class of distributions is α-approximately revenue monotone if for any two distributions D and D + in that class such that
In the rest of the section we observe that subadditive valuations over independent items are α-approximately monotone for some constant factor (Subsection 4.1). We also note that a (significantly) tighter approximate monotonicity would yield a better factor of approximation in Theorem 3.1 (Subsection 4.2). Finally, for the class of (possibly correlated) additive valuations over n items, we prove a reduction from approximate revenue monotonicity to approximately optimal simple auctions (that loses a factor of n). Then we use an infinite gap between max {BREV, SREV} and REV for two correlated items due to Hart and Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2013] to prove an infinite lower bound on approximate revenue monotonicity (Subsection 4.3).
Approximately optimal simple auctions imply approximate monotonicity
As a corollary of our main theorem (Theorem 3.1) we deduce constant-factor approximate monotonicity for subadditive valuations over independent items: COROLLARY 4.2. The class of subadditive valuations over independent items is 338-approximately monotone.
Similarly, from the 6-approximation of Babaioff et al. for additive yields. COROLLARY 4.3. The class of additive valuations over independent items is 6-approximately monotone.
PROOF. For additive functions, BREV and SREV constitute of separate Myerson's auctions, and are therefore revenue monotone. Thus,
For subadditive functions, SREV(D) is no longer monotone, but SREV * q (D) is. This is because SREV q (D i ) is clearly monotone, and SREV * q is just a (scaled) sum of SREV qi (D i ). So we get that there exists a q such that:
5 Recall that we say D + first-order stochastically dominates D if they can be coupled so that when we sample v + from D + and v from D we have v + (S) ≥ v(S) for all S.
Approximate monotonicity implies approximately optimal simple auctions
A closer look at the proof of our main theorem also yields the converse of the above corollaries, namely: a tighter approximate monotonicity for subadditive valuations would yield an improved factor of approximation by simple auctions, as well as a simpler proof. 
If α ≤ 2, this indeed yields a tighter approximation.
Correlated Distributions are not Approximately Monotone
So far we've shown that (for some valuation classes) approximately optimal simple mechanisms imply approximate revenue-monotonicity. Are all classes approximately revenue-monotone? In this subsection we provide a reduction from an instance where max {SREV, BREV} does not approximate REV to show an infinite non-monotonicity for correlated items. We first prove a reduction from gaps between BREV and REV to non-monotonicity. 
